In this paper we consider a special class of weighted voting games with two basic characteristics: each player has a positive weight and dichotomous ruleacceptance or rejection. First, we present two real voting paradoxes where a player with positive weight is a dummy. Next, using the knowledge of these paradoxes we generate some theoretical statements.
Introduction
Let N be a nonempty finite set of players in a game G and every subset N S  is referred to as a coalition. The set N is called the grand coalition and  is called the empty coalition. We denote the collection of all coalitions by . The notion of a simple game was introduced by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern in their monumental book "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" in 1944 [8] . This game is a conflict in which the only objective is winning and the only rule is an algorithm to decide which coalitions are winning. 
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Basic Concepts and Definitions in Weighted Voting Games
In this section we will consider a special class of simple games called weighted voting games with dichotomous voting rule -acceptance ("yes") or rejection
Voting games with positive weights and dummy players 2639 ("no"). These games have been found to be well-suited to model economic or political bodies [5] .
The basic formal framework of this study is as follows. 
is the number of players. , then player i is powerless, for more information see [3] .
We will consider three examples. Example 1. The voting method of the Security Council of the United Nations, formed by 5 permanent (USA, UK, France, Russia and China) and 10 temporary members, is the game in which each one of the permanent member has 7 votes and each one of the temporary member has only one vote, the established quota is 39 votes, and there are 45 total votes. We observe that any coalition which does not include all of the 5 permanent members has at most 38 10 7 4    votes, which is an inferior number to the fixed quota. As a result this coalition will not be winning. Hence, each one of the permanent members has the capacity to veto any proposal. For more information see [1] and [7] .  Example 2. The Bulgarian Parliament with 240 seats uses two different rules: a simple majority by quota 121 (more than 2 1 ) and a qualified majority by quota 161 (more than 3 2  is odd. It is easy to prove that:
. In this case 
. Now, it is easy to see that 
Two Voting Paradoxes
In this section we will describe two paradoxes in real voting systems. In principle a player can be assigned weight zero, but in practice this player would be silly, because it would be a dummy. However, a player having a positive weight can also be a dummy. . It is easy to show that this game is proper, see also [1] and [7] . The number of winning coalitions is 14 and they are: {1,2,3,4,5,6}, {1,2,3,4,5}, {1,2,3,4,6}, {1,2,3,5,6}, {1,2,3,4}, {1,2,3,5}, {1,2,3,6}, {1,2,4,5,6}, {1,3,4,5,6}, {2,3,4,5,6}, {1,2,3}, {1,2,4,5}, {1,3,4,5} and {2,3,4,5}. The number of minimal winning coalitions is 4 and they are: {1,2,3}, {1,2,4,5}, {1,3,4,5} and {2,3,4,5}. As a result we decide that player 6 is a dummy. So player 6 or Luxembourg formally was never able to make any difference in the voting process and was a dummy during the period 1958-1973 [6] .
The Voting Paradox of Luxembourg
Obviously 
The Voting Paradox of Nassau Country
In this subsection we will study Nassau Country, New York, which is a region on Long Island. The government of Nassau Country took the form of a Board of Supervisors in 1958 for the period 1958-1964 and in 1964 for the period 1964-1970, one representative for each of various municipalities, who casts a block of votes [2] . There are two special weighted voting games used at various times by Nassau Country. We will discuss these two voting games. 
The First Voting Game
In this game players 1, 2 and 3 are symmetric, but they do not have equal weights. Players 4, 5 and 6 do not have equal weights and they are symmetric too. It is easy to show that this game is also decisive. The number of minimal winning coalitions is also 3 and they are: {1,2}, {1,3} and {2,3}. As a result we see that North Hempstead, Long Beach and Glen Cove (players 4, 5 and 6) are dummies. The number of all winning coalitions is also 32.
The Second Voting Game
As in game 58 N , we see in game 64 N that players 1, 2 and 3 are symmetric, they do not have equal weights, players 4, 5 and 6 are also symmetric and they do not have equal weights. 
On Decision Rules
Some Properties of Weighted Voting Games
There are two cases:
. Player i is a dummy,
, see part (a). This leads to a contradiction; therefore,
The theorem is proven. 
because i and j are symmetric, and i is a dummy. As a result we obtain ) (
. This is a contradiction; therefore, player j is a dummy.
